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I. INTRODUCTION

Title 8 U.S.C. § 1409 of the Immigration and Nationality Act regulates
the conveyance of citizenship at birth to children born abroad and out of
wedlock to United States citizens.' This section is one of the few remaining
statutes in the country which, according to the Supreme Court of the
United States, permissibly categorizes individuals on the basis of sex in
order to establish citizenship rights.2 This categorization depends on
whether it is the female parent or the male parent who wishes to transmit
American citizenship to the child.'
Specifically, section 1409 provides that a mother need only prove
United States nationality at the time of the birth, as well as physical
presence in the United States for a continuous period of one year, in order
to transmit citizenship to her out-of-wedlock child.' A nonmarital father,
however, must satisfy a more comprehensive and burdensome list of
requirements in order to convey citizenship to his child.5 Section 1409
requires the father not only to prove United States nationality at the time
of the child's birth,6 but also mandates him to establish a blood relationship
between himself and the child through clear and convincing evidence.'
Additionally, the father must agree in writing to provide financial support
for the child until the child turns eighteen.' As a final step, the father must
either legitimate the child9 or acknowledge paternity under oath,'" or a
court must
establish paternity by adjudication before the child's eighteenth
1'
birthday.
Arguably discriminatory on the basis of sex, section 1409's separate
requirements for fathers not only likely violate a father's constitutional right
to equal protection of the law,'2 but also strengthen and solidify the notion
of gendered parenthood premised on gender-based stereotypes of

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2000).
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 461 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
Id. § 1409(c).
See id. § 1409(a).
Id. § 1409(a)(2).
Id. § 1409(a)(1).

8. Id. § 1409(a)(3).
9. Id. § 1409(a)(4)(A). The father must legitimate the child "under the law of the [child's]
residence or domicile." Id.

10. Id. § 1409(a)(4)(B).
11. Id. § 1409(a)(4)(C).
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person
shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id. Section 1409's
sex discrimination likely violates the equal protection element of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.
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parenting. 3 On a constitutional level, it is doubtful how such disparate
treatment ofparents based on sex can survive heightened scrutiny, the level
of review under which courts examine gender-based statutes. 4 Section
1409 operates on the biased presumption that a mother is a natural caregiver and instantly forms a connection with her child, thus, forming a
relationship between mother, child, and country.15 This justifies the
conveyance of citizenship at birth. 6 However, a father, as section 1409
assumes, is incapable of nurturing and establishing a similar connection
between father, child, and country.' 7 Hence, section 1409 requires
steps in order to justify granting citizenship at birth through the
additional
8
father.'
Section 1409 runs the risk of being over-inclusive as well as underinclusive in its aim to verify that a relationship exists between the child and
the country vis-a'-vis the parent. Consider the following hypothetical:
Susan, an American citizen who resided in the United States for a
continuous period of more than one year, had a child, Vanessa, out of
wedlock in Spain with Antonio, a Spanish citizen. Ensuing the birth of her
daughter, Susan left Vanessa with Antonio, returned to the United States
and only occasionally inquired as to Vanessa's well-being. 9 Nonetheless,
because Susan satisfied the requirements of section 1409(c), 20 Vanessa is
a United States citizen at birth. This is so despite the fact that Vanessa has
absolutely no relationship with her mother, and thus no connection to her

13. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001) (supporting the beliefthat because a mother
gives birth to the child, the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between mother and child
exists, whereas that same opportunity for a meaningful relationship does not automatically exist
between a father and his child because the father did not give birth to the child).

14. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,533 (1996) (articulating that in cases based
on gender classification, "the reviewing court must determine whether the proffered justification
[for the classification] is 'exceedingly persuasive' and that the justification must be genuine and
not hypothesized). In fact, although there was no majority opinion in Miller, which addressed the

issue of whether section 1409's requirements for fathers to convey citizenship to nonmarital
children are constitutional, five Justices were of the opinion that section 1409 would not survive
heightened scrutiny. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 451-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment); id. at 476 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65 (explaining that one of the government's objectives behind
section 1409 is that the American parent and the child establish a relationship which in turn links
the child to the country).
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Assume for purposes of this hypothetical that although Vanessa lived with Antonio and
he held Vanessa out as his daughter, Antonio never took legal action to seek Spanish citizenship

for Vanessa.
20. The requirements being proof of nationality at the time of the birth and physical

presence in the United States for a continous period of one year. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2000).
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mother's country. In this instance, section 1409 is over-inclusive in its
conferral of citizenship to nonmarital children born abroad.
Next, consider the situation of John, an American citizen who fathered
a child, Thomas, out of wedlock in Germany. The mother, Anna,
abandoned Thomas subsequent to giving birth. John and Thomas then
moved back to the United States, where John cared for and raised Thomas
on his own. John, however, was not aware that, pursuant to section
1409(a), he needed either to legitimate Thomas, acknowledge that Thomas
is his son in writing under oath, or seek adjudication to establish his
paternity before Thomas turned eighteen. Thus, although Thomas maintains
a relationship with his father and his father's country, Thomas is not an
American citizen. This situation illustrates that section 1409 also is underinclusive in conveying citizenship.
The inconsistent results in the examples above are the product of
historically gender-based stereotypes and stubbornly enduring parental
presumptions. These stereotypes, which enlarge the responsibilities of
mothers by labeling them as the default care-givers and confine the roles of
fathers by assuming they cannot nurture, will only continue to exist as long
as they have the force of the law behind them. Section 1409 is one such
example of a law which perpetuates this gender-based view ofparenthood.
In the wake of the progressively changing view, regarding parenthood,
toward shared responsibility and equal capability regardless of gender, this
Note analyzes the discriminatory effect of section 1409 on the rights of
nonmarital fathers. This Note also addresses the gender-based stereotypes
regarding the parental images on which Congress bases section 1409. Part
II traces the origins of coverture in order to gain an understanding of how
gender-based parenthood evolved. Part III explores the history of section
1409, outlining the developments which led to the present form of the
citizenship statute. In Part IV, this Note analyzes Nguyen v. XNS to
illustrate the effect of section 1409 on nonmarital fathers. Part V
deconstructs the parental stereotypes on which the Supreme Court based
its ruling in Nguyen, and presents a more contemporary view of fatherhood.
Finally, Part VI concludes with a suggested revision of section 1409
premised on gender-neutral terms.

21. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENDERED PARENTHOOD:
COVERTURE AND PARENTAL ROLES

A. The Fatheras the PrimaryParentand Supporter
Notions of gendered parenthood can be traced back to the development
of English and American legal theory regarding marital roles and
responsibilities. At common law, the legal fiction of"marital unity" dictated
that a husband and wife became one person under the law-that one person
was the husband.22 Under this theory known as coverture, where the law
deemed the wife to be under the protection and possession of the
husband,' property the wife possessed transferred into the ownership ofthe
husband in exchange for his cover.24
Similarly, in view ofthe belief that legitimate children were also marital
property, the law deemed the father as owning the children25 and having
absolute control in matters related to their upbringing.26 The father's
parental responsibility was described in terms of a natural obligation to
provide for his children.27 This same obligation, however, did not extend to
the mother.2 8 The father had power over his children until their twenty-first
birthday, while the mother was "entitled to no ... power, but only to

22. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442. Specifically,
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very being
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing,
protection, and cover, she performs every thing; and is therefore called in our
law-french afeme-covert.... [Ier condition during her marriage is called I
coverture.
Id. (emphasis in original).
23. At
24. Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards' Fathersand Good Victims: Discarding
Citizens andEqual ProtectionThrough the Failuresof LegalImages, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 557,561
(2000) (citing LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 4 (1996)).
25. Id at 561 (citing MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNINGTHEHEARTH:LAWANDTHEFAMILY

iNNNETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 234-37 (1985)).
26. Id The theory behind treating children as property was one motivated by economics.
Like the wife, whose property and work the husband controlled, a father also controlled his
children and any work the children were capable of producing. Thus, the father would receive an
economic benefit from "owning" his children and the products of their labor. See BLACKSTONE,
supranote 22, at *453.
27. See id. at *447-48.
28. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ONAMERICAN LAW 161 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1971)
("The father is bound to support his minor children, if he be of ability, even though they have
property of their own; but this obligation in such a case does not extend to the mother.").
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' This basis for describing the relationship between
reverence and respect."29
a father and his children characterized fatherhood through property
rationales, rather than in terms of a nurturing parent-child relationship."
A nonmarital child, on the other hand, was nulliusfilius,or the child of
no one. 31 Under the doctrine of nulliusfilius,a child born out of wedlock
had few protections under the law. The child, for example, was not covered
by the laws of custody, maintenance, or inheritance. 32 The policy behind this
treatment of nonmarital children aimed at discouraging premarital
relationships.33 The law was further oriented in the direction of protecting
a man's ability to control claims to his property and family lineage, as well
as safeguarding the interests of a man's legitimate children.34
Although this scheme concerning nonmarital children did little to alter
the mother-child relationship, the same cannot be said of the father-child
relationship. Considering that the only link between a father and his
legitimate child was based on the duty of maintenance,35 the relationship
between a father and his nonmarital child was nonexistent in light of the
discarded duty to support. This created the image of the uninvolved,
unattached nonmarital father,36 leaving the mother to support the child.37

B. A Switch to the Mother as the PrimaryParentandNurturer
The role of the mother as the primary care-giver, with regard to
legitimate children, did not evolve until the nineteenth century.38 With the
increase ofjobs outside the home during the Industrial Revolution, fathers
were not home to ensure the proper upbringing of their children.39 Women
assumed new responsibilities in raising their children. 4' To use Linda Kelly's
words, the nineteenth century gave birth to the "republican mother" whose
duties encompassed indoctrinating her young with American values.4

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *453.
Nancy E. Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood,48 FLA. L. REV. 523, 527 (1996).
Kelly, supra note 24, at 561 (citing GROSSBERG, supra note 25, at 197).
Id.
Linda Kelly, The Alienation of Fathers,6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 184 (2000).
Kelly, supra note 24, at 561.
See supra notes 26-28.
See Kelly, supra note 33, at 184 (describing society's view of the unwed father as

characteristically uncaring).
37. See Friesner v. Symonds, 20 A. 257, 259 (N.J. Pregog. Ct. 1890) (citations omitted)
(discussing a mother's duty to maintain her nonmarital child).
38. Kelly, supra note 24, at 562.
39. Id. (citing MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD: CHILD CARE,

WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE MYTH OF THE GOOD MOTHER 51-54 (1993)).
40. Id.
41. Id. Mothers were now responsible for teaching their children the civic obligations of
being American citizens. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss5/3
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As mothers began to play a greater role, societal views of parenthood,
previously premised on fathers' property interests in children, shifted to a
belief that parenting required nurturing and careful attention to children's
special needs." This care-giving was undertaken solely by mothers. Thus
emerged the notion of gendered parenthood which assigned to the mother
the role of the nurturing parent whose primary obligation was the rearing
of her children.43 A father's obligation, on the other hand, was mainly that
of support and tending to the work force.'
The role ofmothers in regard to nonmarital children also changed.45 The
law's primary interest in nonmarital children shifted from discouraging out
of wedlock relationships, to ensuring that nonmarital children would not
become a financial burden on the state.4 6 Thus, the law assigned mothers

the obligation ofnurturing their children, while fathers were responsible for
supporting them.47 Charging nonmarital fathers with the duty to maintain
gave rise to the stereotype of unwed fathers as "debtors and criminals" in
need of reprimanding by the law.48

As evidenced above, this country mainly operated, and to some extent
continues to operate, on the notion that only mothers are capable of raising
children. Thus, if society equates parenting with nurturing and nurturing

with mothering, parenting in turn is linked to mothering. This phenomenon
works to exclude fathers from parenting roles.49 Views of motherhood
mostly hinge on the presumption that mothers are the epitomes of the selfsacrificing primary caretakers. Society's view of fatherhood, on the other
hand, usually rests on the stereotype of the unattached, uninvolved parental

42. Id Society no longer viewed children as a property interest and economic investment
for the father in the children's work product. Id Instead, society now viewed children as delicate
little beings with special needs requiring special attention. Id
43. The fact that mothers were viewed as nurturers gave rise to the "tender years" doctrine,
where it was presumed that a young child was best left in the custody of the mother, who could
better tend to the child's delicate needs. See id at 563 (citing GROSSBERG, supranote 25, at 23754).
44. Id.
45. Id
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting GROSSBERG, supra note 25, at 215).

49. However, in the past, the Supreme Court has struck down statutes based on this
presumption that mothers, and not fathers, are the sole concerned parents. In Caban v.
Mohammed,441 U.S. 380,394 (1979), for example, the Supreme Court struck down aNew York
statute that allowed mothers, but not fathers, to unilaterally block the adoption of their nonmarital
children. The Supreme Court reasoned that the statute was discriminately based on the
presumption that fathers are less qualified than mothers in taking care of their children. Id. This
shift toward equality in parenting rights should also be extended to a father's right to pass
citizenship to his nonmarital children.
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figure, incapable of nurturing and merely responsible for the financial
maintenance of his child.
The above stereotype is especially prevalent when the child is born out
of wedlock. There, society's view of the dedicated mother and the
irresponsible father is even more pronounced. Such notions of parenthood
not only work to limit how society deems parental roles, but also how
Congress views parental responsibility, which is in turn reflected in
discriminatory laws regarding unwed mothers and fathers. Section 1409,
dealing with the transmission of citizenship to children born abroad out of
wedlock, is one example of a law that discriminates based on Congress'
perceptions of parental roles.
III. THE HISTORY OF SECTION 1409: GENDER-BASED
TRANSMISSION OF CITIZENSHIP

A. Citizenship Transmission Through the Father
At common law, citizenship was determined by either 'jus soli,"
meaning place of birth, or "jus sanguinis," meaning through blood
relation." Jus soli was the primary method of determining citizenship, as
embodied by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution." Thus, any
person born in the United States was a United States citizen at birth.5 2 The
doctrine ofjus sanguinis, on the other hand, conferred citizenship at birth
by descent when a child was born abroad to a United States citizen.53
Subsequent citizenship laws regarding children born abroad reflected the
bisection of parenthood into gendered roles. Considering the fact that
children were treated like the father's property at common law, coverture
notions permeated the first citizenship statute for children born abroad. 4
The Act of March 26, 1790 provided that a child born abroad to a United
States citizen would be considered an American citizen at birth, unless the
child's father had not resided in the United States. The 1790 Act read as
follows: "[T]he children of citizens of the United States... born.., out of
the limits of the UnitedStates,shall be considered as natural born citizens:
Provided,That the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose

50. See STEPHENH. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATIONLAWANDPOLICY 1030-37 (1992) (discussing

the doctrines ofjus soli and jus sanguinis).
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
52. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." Id
53. See supra note 50, at 1031-33.
54. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 104.
55. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss5/3
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fathers have never been resident in the United States." 6 Likewise, later
revisions to the Act in 1795 and 1802 conferred citizenship only upon the
condition that the father, at one time, resided in the United States. 7
As Justice Ginsburg indicated in Millerv. Albright, Congress intended
for citizenship to pass to children born abroad only when the father, to the
exclusion of the mother, had at one time resided in the United States and
was a citizen. 8 These Acts were based on notions of coverture, which
deemed the father as owning his children, 9 and prohibited the mother from
passing a national identity to her children. Laws of this sort ignored the
mother, and focused only on the possessory link between father and child.
Justice Ginsburg further highlighted the ambiguity present in the 1790
Act's use of the words "children of citizens."6 One could read the words
to mean that the children of a United States citizen mother and a foreign
father would acquire citizenship, as long as the father had resided in the
United States.61 Alternatively, "children of citizens" could mean that both
the mother and the father had to be United States citizens in order for
citizenship to pass to their children.62
However, in 1855 Congress resolved any confusion surrounding the
citizenship statute by passing an act which clearly stated that children born
abroad became citizens at birth only if the father was a United States
citizen. 63 This act was codified as section 1993 of the Revised Statutes.6
Thus, section 1993 effectively incorporated theories of coverture, namely
that of the father owning his children, into the citizenship act. Mothers were
ignored when addressing the citizenship of their own children. By
channeling the transmission ofcitizenship through the father, mothers were
excluded from conveying their American citizenship to children born
abroad. This would be of little consequence to the legitimate child, who

56. Id
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Act of Jan. 29, 1795, § 3, 1 Stat. 415; Act of Apr. 14, 1802, § 4, 2 Stat. 155.
523 U.S. 420, 461 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 25-26.
Miller, 523 U.S. at 461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Binney, The Alienigenea ofthe UnitedStates,2 AM.

L. REG. 193,203-05 (1854)).
62. IM (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
63. See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, § 1, 10 Stat. 604.
64. Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes read as follows:
All children heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction
of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth
citizens therefore, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the rights
of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the
United States.
Miller, 523 U.S. at 462 (quoting REV. STAT. § 1993).
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would nevertheless become a citizen at birth through the father if the father
was an American citizen.
Further, since Congress did not distinguish between legitimate and
nonmarital children born abroad, one could reasonably conclude that,
pursuant to section 1993, a nonmarital child would become a citizen once
legitimated by the father." This left nonmarital children whose fathers failed
to legally recognize them and whose mothers were incapable of transmitting
citizenship without the benefit of acquiring their parents' American
citizenship.
B. Citizenship TransmissionThrough the Mother
It was not until 1934 that Congress amended section 1993 to allow
mothers to confer citizenship to children born abroad, thus ending the
gender-based discriminatory treatment of mothers. The amended section
1993 provided that any child born abroad "whose father or mother or both
at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United States,"
would also be a citizen of the United States so long as the mother or the
father previously resided therein.' According to Congress, the purpose
behind the change was "to establish complete equality between American
men and women in the matter of citizenship for themselves and for their
children."'67 This seemingly erased the gender boundaries present in the
citizenship statute.
C. Citizenship Transmissionto NonmaritalChildren
Although the 1934 Act did not mention nonmarital children, courts
interpreted the Act as allowing the transmission of citizenship through the
mother to children born abroad out of wedlock. 8 Congress replaced the

65. Id at 462 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 162, 164-65 (1920)).
66. Act of May 24, 1934, § 1, 48 StaLt. 797. The relevant language of the Act read as
follows:
Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States,
whose father or mother or both at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen
of the United States, is declared to be a citizen of the United States; but the
rights of citizenship shall not descend to any such child unless the citizen father
or citizen mother, as the case may be, has resided in the United States previous
to the birth of such child.

Id.
67. S. REP. No. 865, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1934); accordH.R. Rep. No. 131, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess., at 2 (1933).
68. Miller, 523 U.S. at 466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 7 C. GORDON ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 93.04[2][b], at 93-42 (1992)).
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1934 Act six years later with the passing ofthe Nationality Act of 1940, the
precedent statute to section 1409 ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act.69
The 1940 Act incorporated numerous provisions, which were not present
in the now obsolete 1934 Act.70 For example, the 1940 Act set up various
conditions regarding the transmission of citizenship to a child dependent on
whether the child was born in an outlying territory of the United States,
whether the mother or father or both were United States citizens, and
whether the child was born out of wedlock.7 Like the 1934 Act, both
mother and father could equally transfer their citizenship to legitimate
children.72 With regard to children born out of wedlock, however, the 1940
Act added myriad requirements that applied to the father, and not to the
mother, which made it exceedingly difficult for the father to transmit
citizenship to children born out of wedlock.73
As for the mother's ability to transmit citizenship to nonmarital children,
the 1940 Act required only that the mother have previously resided in the
United States or in an outlying possession of the United States. 4 This
transmission was conditioned on the fact that the father had not legitimated
the child, or that paternity had not been established by court order.75 If
citizenship was to be established through the father, on the other hand, the
father had to legitimate the child, or a court had to adjudicate paternity
before the child's eighteenth birthday.76 Additionally, the child had to reside
inthe United States for at least five years before turning twenty-one.77 With
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Congress amended the
previous 1940 Act by removing the condition that mothers could transmit
citizenship only ifthe father had not legitimated the child, or paternity had
not been established through adjudication.7"
These new additions to the 1940 Act seemed to cloud Congress'
previous intent during the 1934 revisions "to establish complete equality
between American men and women in the matter of citizenship for
themselves and for their children."79 Where the Act had previously
discriminated against women, it now discriminated against men. In essence,

69.
70.
71.
72.

See Nationality Act of 1940, §§ 201-205, 54 Stat. 1138-40.
Miller, 523 U.S. at 466 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
Id.(Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).

73. Id.at 466-67 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
74. Nationality Act of 1940 § 205, 54 Stat. 1139-40.

75. Id.
76. Id.

77. Id
78. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 309, 66 Stat. 236, 238-39 (codified as
amended 8 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1952)).
79. S. REP. No. 865, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1934); accordH.R.RE!'. No. 131, 73d Cong.,

1st Sess., at 2 (1933).
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Congress corrected one wrong by allowing citizenship to pass through
mothers, and subsequently created another wrong by requiring so much
more ofnonmarital fathers. This placed nonmarital fathers at a disadvantage
when compared to their female counterparts in the transmission of
citizenship to their children.
The 1952 Act remained unchanged for thirty-four years. In 1986,
Congress further amended the Act by substituting the formal legitimation
requirement for fathers with either a written acknowledgment of paternity
or adjudication of paternity before the child's eighteenth birthday. 0 As
Justice Ginsburg noted in Miller, this made it seemingly easier for fathers
to transmit their American citizenship to children born abroad and out of
wedlock."
However, Congress added two further requirements which would make
it more cumbersome than before for nonmarital fathers to transmit their
citizenship. 2 Namely, Congress required that a father prove paternity
through "clear and convincing evidence," and that the father provide in
writing a promise to support the child until the child's eighteenth birthday. 3
Requirements for the transmission of citizenship through the mother,
however, remained the same.' Congress required only that the mother have
been an American citizen at the time of the child's birth, and that she had
resided in the United States or in one of its territories for at least one year
before the child's birth. 5 Congress codified the Act ofNovember 14, 1986
as 8 U.S.C. § 1409, which remains the current law regarding the
transmission of citizenship to children born abroad out of wedlock. 6
To summarize, if a father is to transmit his United States citizenship to
his child born abroad out of wedlock, section 1409 requires that the father
establish a relationship by clear and convincing evidence, that the father
have United States nationality at the time of the child's birth, and that the
father agree in writing to provide financial support to the child until the
child's eighteenth birthday. Additionally, while the child is under the age
of eighteen, the father must either legitimate the child, acknowledge
paternity in writing under oath, or a court must adjudicate paternity of the
child. A mother, on the other hand, needs only to prove that she was a
80. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
85. Id.(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Act of Nov. 14, 1986, § 13, 100 Stat. 3657 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1986))).
86. See Act ofNov. 14, 1986, § 13, 100 Stat. 3657 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1409
(1986)).

87. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(l)-(3) (2001).
88. Id. § 1409(a)(4).
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United States national at the time of the child's birth, and that she was
physically present in the United States or one of its possessions for a
continuous period of one year prior to the birth of the child. 9
The government's first objective underlying section 1409 aims at
verifying that a biological parent-child relationship is present so as to avoid
fraud.90 The different requirements between mothers and fathers are
premised on the fact that while maternity is obvious as birth, paternity is
not.' The government's second objective is to assure that atie between the
parent, child, and the United States exists in order to justify the conference
of American citizenship to the child.92 The disparity in requirements
between mothers and fathers is based on the belief that the opportunity for
a significant relationship exists from the moment of birth with regard to the
mother, whereas an unwed father may not even know of the birth or care
for the child.93 Arguably, section 1409 is discriminatory on the basis of
gender classification in that it unjustifiably relies on sex and on genderbased stereotypes ofwhich parent forms. more solid relation with the child
in order to confer United States citizenship on the child. This point is no
clearer than in Nguyen v. INS.94

IV. NGUYEN v INS ANALYZED: SECTION 1409 AND ITS IMPACT ON
NONMARITAL FATHERS

A. The Facts of the Case
On September 11, 1969, petitioner Tuan Alm Nguyen was born out of
wedlock in Saigon, Vietnam to father and co-petitioner Joseph Boulais, a
United States citizen, and to mother Hung Thi Nguyen, a Vietnamese
citizen.95 Prior to Nguyen's birth, Boulais served in the United States Army
for three years and received an honorable discharge in 1963.96 Thereafter,
Boulais moved to Vietnam to work for a military contractor, Pacific
Architect Engineer, and commenced his relationship with Hung Thi
Nguyen.97 Shortly after Nguyen was born, Boulais and Hung Thi's
relationship ended.9"

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id § 1409(c).
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001).
See id
Id at 64-65.
See id at 65-67.
d at 62-63, 65-67.
Id. at 57; Brief of Petitioners at 4, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071).
Brief of Petitioners at 4, Nguyen (No. 99-2071).
Id
Id
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After the breakup of his parents, Nguyen lived with Boulais.99 In 1975,
when he was six years old, Nguyen left Vietnam for the United States,00
where he became a lawful permanent resident pursuant to the Indochinese
Refugee Act."0 ' Thereafter, Boulais raised Nguyen in Texas and financially
supported Nguyen during Nguyen's minority.'0 2 However, Boulais did not
legitimate Nguyen or establish paternity prior to Nguyen's eighteenth
10 3
birthday, likely due to the fact that he was unaware of the need to do so.
In 1997, though, Boulais proved his paternity based on DNA testing.'
What became of Nguyen's biological mother is unknown, as Boulais and
Nguyen lost contact with her when Nguyen moved to the United States.'
In 1992, after Nguyen pled guilty to two felony charges,0 6 a Texas state
court sentenced Nguyen to two eight-year terms to be served
concurrently.'0 7 In 1995, the Immigration and Naturalization Services
commenced deportation proceedings against Nguyen, pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii), stating that Nguyen was an alien convicted of
two counts involving moral turpitude and aggravated felony. 108 Two years
later, the immigration judge ordered Nguyen to be deported to Vietnam. 109

99. Id. The Court, however, reported the facts as presented in Brief for Respondents, and
stated thatNguyen lived with Boulais' girlfriend whileNguyen was in Vietnam. See Nguyen, 533
U.S. at 57; Brief for Respondents at 5, Nguyen v. INS 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071).
100. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57. Nguyen left Vietnam with Boulais' new wife and her family
following the fall of Saigon to North Vietnamese troops. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Nguyen (No.
99-2071).
101. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Nguyen (No. 99-2071).
102. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57; Brief for Petitioners at 5, Nguyen (No. 99-2071).
103. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Nguyen (No. 99-2071).
104. Id.
105. Id. It is possible that Nguyen's biological mother may not have survived the war. See id.
106. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57. Nguyen pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault on a minor.
Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Section 1227, regarding deportable aliens, provides in pertinent part:
(ii)... Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more
crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal
misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether
the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable.
(iii)... Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after
admission is deportable.
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2000).
109. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57. At the deportation hearing, Nguyen testified that he was a
Vietnamese citizen, thus contributing to the immigration judge's order of deportation. Id.Nguyen,
however, later claimed that he was a United States citizen pursuant to § 1409(a). Brief of
Petitioners at 6, Nguyen (No. 99-2071). Upon speculation, it is likely that Nguyen's change in
position can be attributed to advice from his counsel alerting Nguyen that he could qualify for
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Nguyen, now twenty-eight years old, appealed the immigrationjudge' s
deportation order to the Board of Immigration and Appeals."' Nguyen
asserted that he was not an alien, but rather a United States citizen pursuant
to section 1409, and therefore not deportable."' It was during this appeal
that Boulais obtained an order ofparentage, following a DNA test proving
his paternity to a likelihood of 99.98%."2 The Board, however, did not
consider the paternity evidence and dismissed the appeal, holding that
Boulais did not satisfy section 1409(a)'s requirements for transmitting
American citizenship to Nguyen at birth."'
Boulais and Nguyen appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, and asserted that section 1409 violated Boulais' equal protection
rights because the statute classifies on the basis of a parent's sex in order
to transmit citizenship to a child born abroad and out of wedlock." 4 The
Fifth Circuit, however, rejected the constitutional challenge."' Thereafter,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to address whether the
statutory distinction in section 1409 between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers violates the equal protection guarantee in the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment." 6 The Supreme Court held that it did not." 7
B. The Applicable Standardof Review
When addressing sex-based classifications, such as the one in section
1409, the applicable standard of review is heightened scrutiny as set out in
UnitedStatesv. Virginia.18 Virginiainvolved the Virginia Military Institute
(VMI), a prestigious institution of higher learning and cadet training that
accepted only male applicants." 9 In that case, the Supreme Court analyzed

American citizenship from birth under § 1409 since his father was an American citizen.
110. Brief of Petitioners at 6, Nguyen (No. 99-2071).
111. Id
112. Id. at 7.
113. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58-59.
114. Id. at 58.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 56-57.
117. Id. at 58-59.
118. 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
119. Id. at 520. VMI supported its reason for excluding women by arguing that "single-sex
education provides important educational benefits" and increases "diversity in educational
approaches." Id. at 535 (quoting Brief for Cross-Petitioners at 20, 25, United States v. Virginia
518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107)). VMI further justified the exclusion of female
students by claiming that the school's method of training and its adversative approach would have
to be changed if VMI admitted women. Ra. (quoting Brief for Cross-Petitioners at 33-36, Virginia
(Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107)).
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whether VMI's admissions policy, depriving female students ofthe prestige
20
of being associated with VMI, violated the equal protection guarantee.1
In holding that VMI's admissions policy was unconstitutional because
it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,12 1 the
Supreme Court explicated the standard of review required in addressing
gender-based government action. First, the Supreme Court reiterated that
to defend the government's position, the government must demonstrate "an
exceedingly persuasive justification" for the action. 2 2 The government
meets this burden by demonstrating that the classification serves an
important governmental function, and that the means are substantially
related to that function.123 Additionally, "the justification must be genuine,
not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation."' 24
The Supreme Court further highlighted that the government must not
base its justifications on "overbroad generalizations about the different
talents, capacities, or preferences ofmales and females."' Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court indicated that the ruling in Virginia should not be
interpreted as making sex a proscribed classification, as there are inherent
physical differences between men and women. 26 These classifications,
27
however, cannot be used to the disadvantage of any one sex.'
C. Section 1409: Doubyfully Surviving HeightenedScrutiny
In Miller v. Albright, 28 the Supreme Court addressed whether the
difference in requirements to gain citizenship between a nonmarital child of
a mother and a nonrmarital child of a father in section 1409 was
constitutional, and whether it would survive heightened scrutiny. 129 The
facts in Miller were somewhat similar to those in Nguyen. In Miller,
petitioner Lorena Penero Miller was born on June 20, 1970 in the
Phillippines to Charlie Miller, an American Citizen, and to Luz Penero, a
Filipino national. 30 Charlie and Luz were not married.'

120. Id. at519.
121. Id. at 534.
122. Id. at 531 (citing J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136-37 (1994) and Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
123. Id. at 533 (citing Miss. Univ.for Women, 458 U.S. at 724).
124. Id.
125. Id. (citations omitted).
126. Id. (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)).
127. See id. at 533-34.
128. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
129. See id. at 428 (citation omitted). Note here that the Supreme Court addressed whether
the statute discriminated against the child, not the parent. See id.
130. Id. at 424-25. The facts in Miller differ from those in Nguyen in that whereas Nguyen
lived with his father in the United States since Nguyen was six years old, Nguyen v. INS, 553 U.S.
53, 57 (2001), Lorena Penero Miller never lived with her father and did not come to the United
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In 1992, Lorena applied for registration as a United States citizen with
the Texas State Department, but was denied citizenship from birth because
Charlie did not follow the requirements of section 1409 for conferring
citizenship to Lorena when she was born. 32 Lorena and Charlie appealed
the denial, claiming that section 1409 violated Charlie's equal protection
rights by requiring more of him than it would of a mother for transmitting
citizenship to Lorena."' The Eastern District of Texas, however, later
13 4
dismissed Charlie from the suit, and he did not appeal the dismissal.
Lorena's case marked the first time the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether section 1409 violated equal protection rights. The
Supreme Court, however, was unable to reach a majority decision on the
issue.'35 Justice Stevens, writing the plurality opinion and joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, concluded that section 1409 did not violate the Fifth
Amendment.' 36 Concurring in the judgment, Justices'Scalia and Thomas
opined that even if section 1409 violated equal protection rights, the
Supreme Court could not grant citizenship to Lorena as a remedy because
that was a power reserved for Congress. 3 7 Also concurring in thejudgment
and writing separately, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy,
indicated that Lorena did not have standing to raise the equal protection
rights of her father, and therefore, Justice O'Connor did not reach the
question presented.'38 Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer dissented,
arguing that section 1409 violated equal protection, as it was based on
stereotypical presumptions of which parent forms a bond with the child.'39

States until after her twenty-first birthday. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 425.
131. Id. at425.
132. Id. at 426.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 427.
135. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58 (describing the breakdown of the opinion in Miller).
136. Miller, 523 U.S. at 424. Justice Stevens believed that the different requirements for
citizenship transmission under section 1409 were supported by valid governmental interests, and
therefore not unconstitutional. Id.
137. Id at 459 (Scalia, J., concurring injudgment). Justice Scaliawrote that, because Lorena
was not a citizen under any act of Congress, thejudiciary had no power to confer citizenship since
Congress has plenary power in matters of immigration and nationality. Id at 456, 459 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (quoting United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 474 (1917)).
138. Id. at 446 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Justice O'Connor highlighted that
Charlie did not appeal the dismissal of his claim, and that Lorena did not have standing to bring
the equal protection violation on behalf of her father. Id. at 448 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment).
139. l at460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at471 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer found that section 1409 was premised on overbroad generalizations, and thus flew in
the face of the Court's holding in Virginia that such statutes are impermissible if based on
assumptions regarding the different abilities of women and men. See id. at 460 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); id.at 471 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Five members of the Supreme Court, however, seemed to be of the
14
opinion that section 1409 would not survive heightened scrutiny. 1
According to Justice O'Connor, who was joined by Justice Kennedy, it
would be doubtful that any gender classification based on the stereotype of
which parent has a closer tie to the child would survive heightened
scrutiny.' 4 ' Justice Breyer, together with Justices Souter and Ginsburg, also
indicated that section 1409 would
not survive heightened scrutiny for the
42
same reason alluded to above.
The Supreme Court's decision in Miller created much uncertainty in
determining whether section 1409 was constitutional.143 This is why the
Court addressed section 1409's constitutionality for a second time in
Nguyen. " Thus, it seemed that Nguyen gave the Supreme Court another
opportunity to recognize how section 1409 undermines unwed fathers'
rights and perpetuates gendered parenthood by assuming that only mothers
form close bonds with their children. However, despite the fact that a
majority of the Supreme Court in Millerbelieved that section 1409 would
not survive heightened scrutiny, a majority of the Court in Nguyen upheld
the statute's constitutionality and reinforced the underlying parental
stereotypes.
D. A StereotypicalInterpretationof Section 1409
In holding section 1409 constitutional, the Supreme Court in Nguyen
seemingly applied heightened scrutiny to section 1409's sex-based
classification. 145 The Supreme Court determined that the statute served
important governmental objectives and that its classifications were
substantially related to accomplishing those objectives.'46 These objectives
encompassed "assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists,"' 47
and "ensur[ing] that the child and the citizen parent have some
demonstrated opportunity... to develop.., real... everyday ties."'4 The

140. See id. at 451-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 476 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
141. Id at 451-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
142. Id. at 476 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143. See Nguyen v. INS, 553 U.S. 53, 58 (2001) (comparing Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528
(5th Cir. 2000), the case below Nguyen, with Lake v. Reno, 226 F.3d 141 (2nd Cir. 2000) and
United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1999)).
144. Id.
145. See id. at 60.
146. Id. at 60-61 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
147. Id. at 62.
148. Id. at 64-65.
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to section 1409(a)(4), and
Supreme Court considered only the challenge
49
not the challenge to section 1409(a)(3).
Regarding the first objective, the Court relied on reproductive biology
and concluded that fathers and mothers are not similarly situated regarding
proof of biological parenthood. 50 According to the Supreme Court, while
it is obvious who the mother is at birth,' the same is not so with regard to
the father, who need not be present at the birth.152 Even if the father is
present, that is not incontestable proof of paternity.1 1 3 Thus, section
54
1409(a)(4)'s requirements verify paternity and eliminate fraud.
Additionally, the Supreme Court rejected Nguyen and Boulais' argument

that, in light of sophisticated modem DNA tests, section 1409(a)(1)'s
provision requiring clear and convincing evidence of the relationship
between father and child is enough to ensure paternity.' 55
Next, the Supreme Court addressed the government's second objective,
and once more focused on biology. The Supreme Court reasoned that the
opportunity for a meaningful relationship between a mother and her foreign
born child exists at the moment of birth. 56 According to the Supreme
Court, however, the same is not true regarding the unwed father since he
may not even be aware of the fact that he conceived a child.'57 This is
especially true if conception occurred overseas. 5 The Supreme Court
explained that verifying the existence of this opportunity ensures that

149. Id. at 60. The Supreme Court did not focus on section 1409(a)(3), requiring that the
father agree in writing to support the child, because Congress added that subsection after
Nguyen's birth. Id. The Supreme Court further declined to address section 1409(a)(3) because
upholding the requirements in section 1409(a)(4), namely that, before the child turns eighteen,
the father legitimate the child, acknowledge paternity in writing under oath, or that a court
adjudicate paternity, would be determinative in the instant case. Id.
150. Id. at63.
151. Id. at 62. Proof of maternity is almost always documented by a birth certificate, hospital
records, and witnesses present at birth. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.;see alsoCaban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,397 (1979) (describing that in carrying
and bearing the child, the relationship between the mother and child is clear, whereas determining
the relationship between the father and the child relies on other measures); Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977) (explaining that the difficulty in proving paternity justifies the
demanding standard for nonmarital children to claim under their fathers' estates).
154. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63.
155. See id. at 63-64. The Supreme Court indicated that section 1409 did not require DNA
testing, that Congress did not have to select only one method of proving paternity, and that in any
event, DNA testing is too expensive and not widely available. Id.
156. Id. at 65.
157. Id.
158. Id. The Supreme Court particularly commented on the situation of young American men
serving in the Armed Forces overseas. See id.
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conveying citizenship to the foreign
born child arises out of the child's "ties
59
and allegiances" to this country.
Even if this relationship does not evolve in every case, according to the
Court, section 1409(a)(4)'s scheme is easily administrable and avoids the
subjectivity and intrusiveness of having to investigate into the particulars of
any one bond."6° In rejecting Nguyen and Boulais' argument that in order
to achieve the above objective, section 1409 relies on gender-based
stereotypes of which parent forms a closer bond with the child, the
Supreme Court articulated that the different treatment of unwed mothers
and unwed fathers did not arise from stereotypes, but from the difference
in circumstances when the child is born. 61
Lastly, the Supreme Court addressed whether the means Congress
chose to effectuate its objectives were substantially related to the
governmental interests. 62 The Supreme Court held that the policy was in
fact substantially related to advancing the opportunity for a meaningful
relationship to develop between father and child during the child's
minority. 6 ' Additionally, the Supreme Court considered the requirements
a minor burden on the father, and highlighted that Nguyen had other
avenues to pursue in order to claim citizenship.'
In a spirited dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for not
conforming to heightened scrutiny, and argued that the means chosen in
section 1409(a)(4) were not substantially related to the goal of verifying a
blood relationship. 61 Justice O'Connor indicated that taking into account
159. Id. at 67.
160. Id. at 69.
161. Id. at 68.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 68-70. The Supreme Court commented on the fact that a number of other statutes
regarding citizenship and naturalization call for an incident creating a link between the child and
the United States before the child turns eighteen years of age. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1431
(2000)) (explaining a child born abroad to a citizen parent and a noncitizen parent becomes a
citizen if naturalization of the noncitizen parent occurs prior to the child turning eighteen years
of age and the child commences residency in the United States before the child turns eighteen);
8 U.S.C. § 1432 (imposing the same conditions as in section 1431 when the child is born abroad
to two alien parents who are naturalized)).
164. Id at 70-71. For example, Nguyen could have pursued citizenship through 8 U.S.C. §§
1423 and 1427. See id. However, due to the character of Nguyen's offenses, these options were
no longer available to him. Id.
165. Id. at 78-79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor shed light on the fact that the
majority did not really explain the importance of verifying a blood relationship, which Justice
O'Connor presumed to be aimed at avoiding fraud in the transmission of citizenship. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Further, Justice O'Connor indicated that verifying a blood relationship
may not have actually been one of the purposes behind section 1409(a)(4), since Immigration and
Naturalization Services did not rely on this fact in order to justify the sex-based classification. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Respondent at 11, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001)
(No. 99-2071)).
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that section 1409(a)(1) already required clear and convincing proof of
paternity, section 1409(a)(4) was unnecessary. 6 6 With regard to the interest
in assuring a meaningful relationship, Justice O'Connor doubted that the
mere opportunity for such a relationship would be as important in the
absence of an actual relationship. 67 Finally, Justice O'Connor criticized the
majority for relying on the stereotype that unwed mothers almost always
and care for their children, while
form a close bond with their children
68
unwed fathers typically do not.
E. Reexamining Nguyen
The Supreme Court's ruling in Nguyen seems to misapply the standard
of heightened scrutiny, and sets a precedent that ultimately perpetuates
gendered parenthood by making it difficult for unwed fathers to be
recognized as parental figures. In deciding that section 1409(a)(4) met the
burden of establishing important governmental objectives and that the
means chosen by the government to accomplish those goals were
substantially related to the objectives, the Supreme Court overlooked the
fact that the government's justification for the statute relied on overbroad
generalizations about the capacities of unwed mothers and fathers with
regard to parenting. 69 Additionally, the Supreme Court's language
concerning the roles of unwed mothers and unwed fathers reinforces
society's stereotypical notions regarding the unwed father's abilities as a
parent.
Although a majority in Miller indicated that section 1409(a)(4) would
likely not survive heightened scrutiny, 70 a majority of the same Court in
Nguyen found that section 1409(a)(4) was in fact constitutional. 7 ' The
Supreme Court defended its ruling by arguing that mothers and fathers are
not similarly situated, due to the circumstances of birth, in regard to
proving biological parenthood.'" Thus, the classification based on sex is
presumably permissible.'73 However, while it is incontrovertible that
mothers and fathers are indeed dissimilarly situated with regard to birth, it
166. Id. at 80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). DNA testing sufficed for Justice O'Connor in order
to establish clear and convincing evidence of paternity. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
167. Id.at 84-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor called attention to the fact that
even if children seemed to have an opportunity to develop a meaningful relationship with their
fathers, the fact of an existing opportunity did not mean that such a relationship truly existed. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).

168. Id. at 86-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
169. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
170. See supratext accompanying notes 140-42.
171. See supranotes 146-48 and accompanying text. This may indicate an arbitrary decision
by the Nguyen Court.
172. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63.
173. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
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is not indisputable that the event of birth is the sole link between parent and
child, and hence the only way to prove biological parenthood in order to
avoid fraud.174
Modem DNA testing, as Boulais utilized in Nguyen,"5 could equally
serve the government's purpose in avoiding fraudulent conveyances of
citizenship.'76 DNA testing is certainly one way to establish clear and
convincing proof of paternity, as required by section 1409(a)(1)."' The
Supreme Court, though, dismissed the suggestion of DNA testing by
explaining that Congress does not require such testing in order to prove
paternity, and that DNA testing is too expensive and not readily available.'
However, as Justice O'Connor correctly indicated, the point is not to
substitute DNA testing for the requirements in section 1409(a)(4), but
merely to allow DNA testing as one of the methods, along with
legitimization, acknowledgment ofpaternity, and adjudication ofpaternity,
as one of the ways with which to provide clear and convincing evidence of
paternity under section 1409(a)(1).' 79 In light of the argument that DNA
testing can function to eradicate the possibility of fraudulent citizenship
conveyance, it is questionable that insisting on further proof of paternity in
section 1409(a)(4) before the child turns eighteen is substantially related to
the government's goal of avoiding fraud.8 Thus, section 1409(a)(4)
doubtfully survives heightened scrutiny.
Moreover, by giving the unwed father the choice of how to provide
clear and convincing proof of paternity under section 1409(a)(1), without
the additional impositions of section 1409(a)(4), the unwed father is put in
the same position as the unwed mother in terms of proving biological
parentage.'
The unwed mother has clear and convincing proof of
maternity with the event of birth and the documentation that follows the

174. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57 (demonstrating that DNA testing can accurately function to
establish paternity).
175. See generallyAlan R. Davis, Comment, Are You My Mother? The Scientific andLegal
Validity ofConventionalBlood Testing andDNA Fingerprintingto EstablishProofofParentage
in Immigration Cases, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REv. 129 (discussing the accuracy and reliability of DNA
testing to prove biological parentage and the use of such testing in immigration cases).
176. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 80-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that modem DNA
testing establishes a biological link that significantly eliminates the probability of fraud in proving
biological parenthood); see also Davis, supra note 175, at 144-45 (discussing that DNA evidence
is vastly accepted in the scientific arena and allows courts to efficiently resolve paternity disputes).
177. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1) (2000).
178. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63. But cf Dowd, supra note 30, at 528 (explaining that genetic
testing establishes paternity in more than 99% of cases, and costs for genetic testing range from
a low of $150 to a high of $600).
179. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 80-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

180. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 81-83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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birth.'82 Likewise, the unwed father also would have proof of paternity if at
any time after the birth he too acquires documentation, in the form of DNA
results or otherwise, providing clear and convincing proof of paternity. 83
This would effect a facially gender-neutral application of the law, and
survive heightened scrutiny."s In this way, the Supreme Court in Nguyen
would have accepted Boulais' DNA results establishing paternity to a
likelihood of 99.98% as clear and convincing proof of paternity, which in
turn would have dispelled the government's concern regarding fraud." 5
In further support of its ruling, the Supreme Court insisted that because
a mother gives birth to her child, the mother and child instantly form a
meaningful relationship giving rise to the child's ties to the country.'86
Because the same opportunity does not exist with the unwed father, the
Supreme Court defended the requirements of section 1409(a)(4) by
articulating that those requirements verify that there is the opportunity for
a relationship between the father and the child,justifying the conveyance of
citizenship. 8 7 This is perhaps the most startling portion of the opinion since
it unquestionably assumes that unwed mothers automatically form bonds
with their children and care for their children, while unwed fathers do
not.'88 Despite the Supreme Court's instruction in Virginia that the
justification for sex-based statutes "must not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different ...
capacities . ..of males and
females,"'8 9 section 1409(a)(4) does just that. It relies on assumptions that
unwed mothers have the capacity to parent, while unwed fathers do not. 9 '
Again, it is doubtful that such sex-based classification can survive
heightened scrutiny.
These outmoded assumptions are premised on common law notions that
unwed mothers take on the responsibility of raising and caring for their
children, whereas unwed fathers assume no responsibility other than what

182. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.

183. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 81-83 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
184. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor further explains that although it is
easier for mothers to provide proof of maternity under this scheme, the ease is attributable to the
fact that mothers and fathers are not similarly situated, and not to the fact that the law itself would

require more of a father in comparison to the mother. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"[D]ifferential impact of a facially neutral law does not trigger heightened scrutiny." Id. at 2071
(O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
185. See Brief for Petitioners at 7,Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071).
186. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65.
187. See id. at 66-67.

188. See Brief of the National Women's Law Center, et. al. as Amici Curie in Support of
Petitioners at 2, Nguyen (No. 99-207 1) [hereinafter Brief of the NWLC].

189. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996),
190. See Brief of the NWLC at 8-9, Nguyen (No. 99-2071).
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the law assigns, if any at all. 9 ' The fact that the above stereotype may be
true in many situations does not permit the implementation in the law of
overbroad generalizations regarding the capacity of unwed fathers to
parent.'9 2 Statutes like section 1409(a)(4), even if reflective of how most
unwed mothers and fathers behave, deny equal protection to those unwed
fathers that do assume the responsibility of fatherhood. This is illustrated
in the case of Nguyen's father, Boulais.
As supported by the facts of the case, Boulais cared for Nguyen since
his infancy, raised Nguyen in the United States, and financially maintained
Nguyen throughout his minority. "' Further, the fact that Nguyen had little
if any contact with his biological mother serves to dispel the notion that
mothers are always the primary caretakers. 194 Boulais' own case functions
to challenge the parental stereotype on which Congress bases section 1409.
Despite these facts, the Supreme Court declined to offer Boulais the same
opportunity to transmit citizenship to the child as an unwed mother would
have had in similar circumstances. The Supreme Court preferred instead to
uphold an easily administrable scheme that would not inquire into the
specific circumstances of Boulais' case.' 95 However, as Justice O'Connor
indicated, the Supreme Court has often declined justifying sex-based
classifications for the purpose of ease in the administrability of the law.' 96
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ignored that Boulais was in fact the
primary caretaker, and placed the rights of Boulais secondary to the rights
of an unwed mother. It is questionable how a law dependent on such a
stereotypical view of parenting has survived constitutional muster.
V.

ELIMINATING PARENTAL STEREOTYPES

A. EmpiricalData
Eliminating the parental stereotypes on which statutes like section 1409
are based may be accomplished by recognizing that there is a changing
trend in fatherhood, and that increasingly more single fathers who have
never been married are assuming caretaking roles with regard to their
191. Id.
192. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 139 n. I (1994) (explaining that even if supported
by empirical data, overbroad sex-based generalizations are prohibited).
193. Brief for Petitioners at 4-5, Nguyen (No. 99-2071).
194. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 86-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor highlights
other situations in which mothers are not the primary caretakers, including if the child is removed
from the custody of the mother due to abuse or neglect, or, as in this case, the child and the mother
are separated by war. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
195. See id.at 69.
196. Id. at 88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S.
142, 152 (1980); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973)).
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children.'97 The generalized assumption that unwed fathers do not form a
bond with their children or care for their children, a presumption present in
section 1409, is not true of the entire group.'98 Population characteristics
compiled by the United States Census Bureau in the year 2000 provide
proof on this point. In 2000, of the thirty-seven million family groups with
children in the United States, two million of those families were singlefather families. 99 This number is a minority in comparison to the whole, but
it is nonetheless a great increase from the figure of 393,000 in 1970. oo
Thirty-four percent of men in single-father families have never married.20'
Another survey complied by the Bendhelm-Thomen Center for Research
Child
Wellbeing of Princeton University indicated that almost one-third
on
of children born in the United States are born to unmarried parents. 2 Of
the sampled population by the Center,20 3 81% of the mothers who
participated in the survey communicated that the father provided financial
assistance throughout the pregnancy. 0 4 More importantly, 99.8% of the
fathers who took part in the survey indicated that they desire to participate
in raising their children.20 5
B. A Different View of Fatherhood
The above data suggest that unwed fathers are assuming more active
caretaking roles in parenting. Thus, there is likely a need to embrace a new
view of fatherhood. In order to see fatherhood through a different lens,
however, society first needs to separate parenting and nurturing from
biology.2" This is something the Supreme Court in Nguyen was unable to
do, for the Supreme Court assumed that the mere biological connection
between mother and child, namely birth, creates an instant parenting and
nurturing bond between the two. 07 The Court further assumed that because

197. See Jason Fields & Lynne M. Casper, America's Familiesand Living Arrangements,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS (U.S. Census Bureau), June 2001, at 6-8.

198. See idi
199. Idat 6-7.
200. See id. at 7.

201. Id. at 8.
202. Fragile Families Research, Dispelling Myths About UnmarriedFathers (BendhelmThomen Center for Research on Child Wellbeing & Social Indicators Survey Center), May 2000,
availableat http:llcrcw.princeton.edu/CRCW/papers/researchbriefl.pdf.

203. The data compiled by the Center represented a sample population taken from major
United States cities, including Austin, Baltimore, Detroit, Newark, Oakland, Philadelphia and
Richmond. See id.
204. Id
205. Id.
206. See Dowd, supra note 30, at 532 (arguing that fatherhood is a cultural role and not a
biological role).
207. See supranotes 156-57 and accompanying text.
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this exact biological connection does not exist between father and child, the
father and child do not develop a relationship where the father acts as the
nurturer." 8 However, if one severs the assumed link between parenting and
the female biological event of birth, it becomes easier to recognize
parenting not as a default biological role, but as a societal role that both
mothers and fathers can assume equally. In this fashion, parenthood
encompasses both motherhood and fatherhood, not just the former. This
sets the stage for the recognition of fathers as nurturers.
Secondly, for society to recognize fathers as nurturers, it may help to
cease equating nurturing with femininity. 9 Children could be socialized to
realize that nurturing need not be solely a female behavior, and that males
have the capacity to nurture as well.210 In this way, nurturing and
masculinity would not be viewed as mutually exclusive, but as a behavior
in which both sexes can equally engage. Thus, nurturing would be gender
neutral, and not a behavior designated to any one particular sex. This would
further aid in the development of a new view of fatherhood. However,
targeting societal notions of parenting, nurturing, and ultimately fathering
in order to establish recognition of nurturing fathers is not the only path to
envisioning a new model of fatherhood. The law itselfalso must be targeted
so that it too reflects the changing trend in fatherhood.
VI. CONCLUSION

For the law to acknowledge that more unwed fathers are becoming
nurturers, and for it to avoid perpetuating the parental stereotypes that
underlie statutes like section 1409, it is likely that the law needs to
refashion such statutes in gender-neutral terms.2 ' While the government
has valid objectives in verifying that citizenship transmission to nonmarital
children born abroad is not fraudulent, and that such conveyance of
citizenship arises from a tie to the United States, it is not valid for the
government to rely on gender-based distinctions to accomplish these goals.
Thus, it is necessary that Congress amend section 1409 so that unwed

208. See id.
209. See Dowd, supra note 30, at 533-34. Professor Dowd discusses the role "sex typing"
plays in how females and males learn what behaviors are expected for their gender group. Id. at
533. She defines sex typing as "the means by which females and males develop feminine and
masculine behaviors, expectations and life goals." Id. If during childhood children can learn that
parental nurturing is a behavior that should be engaged in by both females and males, and that
nurturing should be a goal of both sexes, then perhaps nurturing would no longer be linked to
femininity and would be a behavior expected of both gender groups.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 527 (articulating that a shift to gender neutral laws would eliminate gender
bias and recognize that fathers can nurture their children).
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mothers and fathers are treated equally in the transmission of citizenship to
children born abroad.
Equal treatment of unwed mothers and fathers may be achieved by
eliminating the two separate provisions individually addressing mothers and
fathers,212 and by creating a single statutory scheme that is applicable to
either parent, regardless of sex. First, in order to confer citizenship through
the parent to a child born abroad and out of wedlock, section 1409 could
require that the citizen parent have the nationality of the United States at
the time of the child's birth, and that the parent have resided in the United
States or in one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one
year.2t3
Secondly, section 1409 could require that the parent provide clear and
convincing proofofa blood relationship between the parent and child. 214 In
order to fulfill this requirement, a mother could present her child's birth
certificate assuming the mother's name is represented therein. If one is not
available, the mother could provide other hospital records or present the
results of a DNA test. Since it is possible that an American woman may
attempt to bring a child into this country and claim that the child is hers
when in reality the child is not, the above requirement of clear and
convincing proof of maternity would alert the government to any fraud.
Similarly, a father also could provide clear and convincing proof of
paternity by presenting a birth certificate with his name on it if available, or
by presenting the results of a DNA test. In this way, both unwed mothers
and unwed fathers would have to provide proofofa blood relationship, and
the government would address its concern regarding the fraudulent
conveyance of citizenship215 in a gender-neutral manner.
Lastly, section 1409 could require that the parent provide proof of
regular contact with the child for an extended period of time during the
child's minority. 16 This last requirement, calling for a specific inquiry into

212. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) and (a) respectively.
213. This first requirement tracks the language of section 1409(c) with the exception that
rather than making this applicable to the mother, it makes it applicable to both mother and father
by substituting the gender neutral term of "parent" for "mother." See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c).
214. This provision follows the requirement of section 1409(a)(1), with the alteration that
it would be applicable to both mothers and fathers. See id. § 1409(a)(1); see also Mary Ann Case,
"The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns ": ConstitutionalSexDiscriminationLaw as a Questfor
PerfectProxies,85 CORNELLL. REV. 1447, 1480 (2000) (discussing alternative solutions to Miller
and suggesting that Congress could require that a child of only one citizen parent, irrespective of
whether the parent is the mother or the father, married, or single, offer proof of a parental
relationship in addition to "some uniform and minimal period of parental residence in the United

States").
215. See Nguyen v. INS, 553 U.S. 53, 62-63 (2001).
216. Id at 88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420,470 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)).
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the facts of each case,217 would address the government's concern that the
child form a connection with the United States through the parent during
the formative years of the child's life.218 This type ofproof could encompass
evidence that the child lives with the parent and that the parent raises the
child, that the parent visits with the child often, or that the parent financially
supports the child.219 This scheme would be gender neutral in that it would
recognize that the caretaker is not presumptively the mother, and that an
unwed father can be a caretaker as well. In this manner, the underlying
stereotype in section 1409 of which parent forms a closer bond with the
child would be eliminated. Both unwed mothers and unwed fathers would
be recognized as caretakers. Moreover, this requirement would eliminate
the under-inclusive and over-inclusive effect of the current section 1409 as
suggested by the hypotheticals posited earlier in the Introduction."
In revisiting the facts of Nguyen under the proposed scheme for section
1409, Boulais would have been able to transmit citizenship to his son.
Boulais would have satisfied the first requirement because he was a United
States citizen and lived in the United States for over a year.z22 He would
have also satisfied the second requirement regarding clear and convincing
proof of paternity by presenting the results of the DNA test establishing his
paternity to a likelihood of 99.98%.222 Lastly, in light of the fact that
Boulais cared for and raised Nguyen since infancy, 2 3 Boulais, in addition
to being recognized as the caretaker, would have satisfied the third
requirement by providing proofthat he maintained the requisite connection
with his child in order to transmit American citizenship to Nguyen at birth.
Without the revision to section 1409, however, the law will continue to
discriminate against unwed fathers like Boulais in the transmission of
citizenship to their children. Further, absent any changes, section 1409 will
perpetuate gendered parenthood in citizenship law by failing to recognize
that unwed fathers, although to a lesser degree, do raise children. The need
to revise section 1409 becomes more apparent in light ofthe changing trend
regarding fatherhood which contradicts the stereotype that only mothers fill

217. The Courtin Nguyen thought that this type ofinquiry would be subjective, intrusive, and
difficult to conduct. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 69. However, it is likely that if a particular parent
is seeking to convey citizenship to his or her child, then the parent actively sought to get involved
in such a procedure and would not find the process intrusive. Moreover, as Justice O'Connor
indicated, the Court has repeatedly declined to rely on sex-based classification for the sake of easy
administrability of the law. See id. at 88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 67.
219. But cf Case, supra note 214, at 1481-82 (arguing for an easily administrable bright line
rule that would avoid testimony and investigation into minutia).
220. See supra pp. 2-3.
221. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
222. See Brief of Petitioners at 7, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071).
223. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
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the role ofthe caretaker. 4 If section 1409 remains unchanged, the law will
lag behind the changing role ofthe father in society. Revising section 1409
of the Immigration and Nationality Act would be a step closer to
recognizing the unwed father as parent and nurturer, and achieving gender
equality in parenting matters.22

224. See Pallavi Guniganti, CourtDecisionDemeansDads,U-WIRE, June 22,2001, available
at 2001 WL 20503920 (arguing that, despite stereotypes, men have the skills to take on parenting
roles and that Congress should not impose greater burdens on the increasing number of men who
want to be caretakers).
225. See Editorial, Citizenship and Paternity, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2001, at A20
(articulating that in order to achieve gender equality with regard to parenting, parents should not
be treated differently based on their gender).
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